Court Decision on Employee Discontinuing Medical Treatment
Posted by
Robin MartinekFebruary 22, 2008 1:20 PMStevie Johnson, a custodial worker for the City of Winston-Salem, developed carpel tunnel syndrome after fifteen years of employment and the City of Winston-Salem denied his claim. Without access to health care through workers' compensation and with his health insurance running out, Mr. Johnson was forced to discontinue his medical treatment and physical rehabilitation.
While normally, a person who voluntarily chooses to not accept further medical treatment are found to be at maximum medical improvement, thus limiting their options in way of benefits available through workers' compenssation, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a February 5, 2008 ruling, held that Mr. Johnson's financial inability to continue medical treatment was not a voluntary choice. In so ruling, the Court allows workers with previously denied claims to resume medical treatment without having to overcome the burden of showing a change in their condition to seek additional medical treatment when for reasons beyond their control they could not seek or continue necessary medical treatment.
In addition to the decision regarding medical treatment, the Court also found that where the employee-claimant shows that he was at an increased risk for an occupational disease by his employment, he does not have to show that the disease is "peculiar" to that type of employment.
"A disease is 'characteristic' of a profession when there is a recognizable link between the nature of the job and an increased risk of contracting the disease in question." Booker, 297 N.C. at 472, 256 S.E.2d at 198. A disease is "peculiar to the occupation" when the conditions of the employment result in a hazard which distinguishes it in character from employment generally; the disease need not be one that originated exclusively from the employment. Id. at 473, 256 S.E.2d at 199. Furthermore, the statute does not preclude coverage for all ordinary diseases of life, but only for those "'to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.'" Id. at 475, 256 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-53(13)).
Johnson v. City of Winston Salem.